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Applying the Fragmented Literal 
Similarity Test to Musical-Work and 
Sound-Recording Infringement: 
Correcting the Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films Legacy 
Mark R. Carter, J.D., Ph.D.* 
ABSTRACT 
Copyright law simultaneously protects recorded music in 
two distinct ways: as a musical work (i.e. composition) and as a 
sound recording. Copyright law protects all copyrightable works 
against unapproved reproduction (i.e., copying). Normally, the 
substantial similarity standard tests reproduction infringement. 
A sound-recording sample may be so short as to lack substantial 
similarity to the musical-work and thus not infringe it. But 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films chucked substantial 
similarity to hold that the same sample, however short, 
necessarily infringes the sound-recording reproduction right. 
This disparate copyright protection between musical works and  
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sound recordings of the same sample has led to the “mashup 
problem.” 
Substantial similarity can be broken into two basic types: 
comprehensive nonliteral similarity and fragmented literal 
similarity. This paper proposes a framework for applying the 
fragmented literal similarity test to both musical-work and 
sound-recording reproduction infringement. First, it describes 
the framework for musical works based on the innate 
discretization of musical works as notes. Second, it describes 
breaking sound recordings into sound snippets and weighs the 
copied snippets’ quantitative and qualitative values to the 
copyrighted recording. Third, it outlines applying the 
framework to Swirsky v. Carey, Bridgeport, and Girl Talk’s 
sampling recordings. 
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I. DISPARATE INFRINGEMENT STANDARDS FOR 
COPYING MUSICAL WORKS AND SOUND RECORDINGS 
Copyright law simultaneously protects recorded music in 
two distinct ways: as a musical work (i.e., composition), and as 
a sound recording.1 Copyright law protects all copyrightable 
works against unapproved reproduction (i.e., copying).2 A 
sound-recording sample may be so short as to be de minimis 
and thus not infringe the musical-work reproduction right.3 But 
the same sample, however short, necessarily infringes the 
sound-recording reproduction right.4 Thus, a recording 
containing one sample from one sound recording might not 
infringe the musical work but would necessarily infringe the 
sound recording though the musical work and the sound 
recording would represent the same music. 
This disparate copyright protection has led to the “mashup 
problem.”5 The simplest mashup is “a song created out of pieces 
of two or more songs, usually by overlaying the vocal track of 
one song seamlessly over the music track of another.”6 Gregg 
Gillis, who records as “Girl Talk,” is a notorious mashup 
sampler.7 Gillis samples hundreds of songs to make an album.8 
Does it make sense to hold a mashup artist, like Gillis, liable 
for sound-recording infringement from copying a tiny, 
unrecognizable, sound-recording snippet which fails to infringe 
the underlying musical work? 
 
                                                          
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2), (7) (2006). 
 2. Id. § 106(1). 
 3. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
JAMES NEWTON, Choir, on AXUM (ECM 1981) sampled by BEASTIE BOYS, Pass 
the Mic, on CHECK YOUR HEAD (Grand Royal 1992)). 
 4. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 
792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing FUNKADELICS, Get Off Your Ass and Jam, 
on LET’S TAKE IT TO THE STAGE (Westbound 1975) sampled by N.W.A., 100 
Miles and Runnin’, on I GOT THE HOOK UP (Dimension 1992) (film 
soundtrack)). 
 5. See, e.g., David Mongillo, The Girl Talk Dilemma: Can Copyright Law 
Accommodate New Forms of Sample-Based Music?, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y, Spring 2009, at 3. 
 6. MICHAEL GEOGHEGAN & DAN KLASS, PODCAST SOLUTIONS: THE 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO AUDIO AND VIDEO PODCASTING 45 (2005). 
 7. Mongillo, supra note 5, at 2. 
 8. Girl Talk’s Feed the Animals: The Official Sample List, WAXY.ORG, 
http://waxy.org/2008/10/feed_the_animals_official_sample_list/ (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2013). 
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This paper proposes a framework for applying the 
fragmented literal similarity test to both musical-work and 
sound-recording reproduction infringement. 
Part II gives context for the proposal. First, it reviews the 
history leading to musical-work and sound-recording copyright 
protection for recorded music. Second, it describes the 
substantial-similarity test, including the fragmented literal 
similarity test, for copyrighted-works reproduction 
infringement. Finally, it describes the key court opinions on 
musical-work and sound-recording reproduction infringement 
by sampling. 
Part III presents the proposed fragmented literal similarity 
test framework. First, it describes the framework for musical 
works based on the innate discretization of musical works as 
notes. Second, it describes breaking sound recordings into 
sound snippets and weighs the snippet’s quantitative and 
qualitative values to the copyrighted recording. Finally, it 
outlines applying the framework to three situations: 1) Swirsky 
v. Carey’s musical-work infringement; 2) Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Dimension Films’ sound-recording infringement; and 3) 
potential musical-composition and sound-recording 
infringement by Girl Talk’s Feed the Animals. 
II. INFRINGING RECORDED MUSIC 
A. ONE ROAD TO PROTECTING RECORDED MUSIC IN TWO WAYS—
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR MUSICAL WORKS 
AND SOUND RECORDINGS 
The Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause grants 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”9 Starting in 1790, Congress passed the first of 
many Copyright Acts.10 The 1831 Copyright Act was the first to 
protect music. It granted a musical-composition’s author the 
“sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and 
vending” it.11 To copyright the musical composition, the author 
had to “deposit a printed copy of the title of such . . . musical 
                                                          
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 10. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL 
INFORMATION ECONOMY 22 (2d ed. 2006). 
 11. 1831 Copyright Act, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831). 
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composition in the . . . district court” where the author 
resided.12 For each musical composition copy, the Act also 
required the author to “impress on the face thereof” a deposit 
notice in the district court.13 Thus, the 1831 Act impliedly 
assumed a tangible form for the musical composition. 
Music recording and playback technology progressed 
through the 19th century’s second half. First, Edison invented 
the phonograph in 1877.14 The phonograph recorded sounds in 
grooves on a cylinder which could be played back to make 
sounds approximating the recorded sounds.15 A commercial 
Victrola appeared in 1906.16 Second, several inventors 
developed mechanical music machines based on organs and 
pianos.17 
To keep pace with these technological advances, the 1909 
Copyright Act expanded music protection to include musical-
composition “mechanical” reproduction rights for player piano 
rolls and phonograph records.18 In 1908 the Supreme Court had 
held a musical-composition copy to be “a written or printed 
record of it [the composition] in intelligible notation.”19 The 
Court expressly held piano rolls, music box cylinders, and 
gramophone records were musical composition copies.20 But 
because Congress knew of the rolls, cylinders, and records 
when it amended the copyright laws in 1897 and 1901, but 
levied damages based on sheets copied, the Court reasoned 
Congress had not wanted copyright to extend to rolls, cylinders, 
and records.21 The Court specifically suggested Congress could 
amend the law to include these new media.22 Congress 
responded by including a mechanical-reproduction right in the 
new musical-composition copyright.23 “[The] sale of 
                                                          
 12. Id. § 4. 
 13. Id. § 5. 
 14. Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machs., U.S. Patent No. 
200,521 (filed Dec. 24, 1877). 
 15. Id. 
 16. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 444. 
 17. See, e.g., Organette Patents, ORGANETTE MUSIC REPOSITORY, 
http://music.organettes.com/patents/home (last updated Jan. 24, 2011). 
 18. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 26–27. 
 19. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). 
 20. Id. at 17–18. 
 21. Id. at 16–18. 
 22. Id. at 18. 
 23. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 47–48. 
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interchangeable parts, such as disks, rolls, bands, or cylinders 
for use in mechanical music-producing machines adapted to 
reproduce the copyrighted music” infringed the new musical-
composition copyright.24 
Over sixty years later, to prevent bootleggers from copying 
and distributing previously recorded music,25 Congress 
conferred a copyright in sound recordings made on or after 
February 15, 1972.26 (State copyright laws protected sound 
recordings made before February 15, 1972.27 Federal copyright 
does not preempt state copyright protection for sound 
recordings made before February 15, 1972.28) The 1971 Sound 
Recording Act added sound recordings to the copyrightable-
work types.29 The Act defined sound recordings as “works that 
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other 
sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion 
picture.”30 The copyright owner had the exclusive reproduction 
right to “duplicate the sound recording in a tangible form that 
directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the 
recording . . . .”31 The Act defined sound recording 
reproductions as “material objects . . . from which the sounds 
could be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated . . . .”32 The sound recording definition expressly 
included “parts of machines of instruments serving to 
reproduce mechanically the musical work” including 
“interchangeable parts, such as discs or tapes for use in 
mechanical music-producing machines . . . .”33 
The 1971 Sound Recording Act also expressly retained a 
distinct musical-work copyright for recorded music.34 The Act 
provided separate notice requirements for musical works and 
                                                          
 24. 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081–82 (1909) 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006)). 
 25. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 399–400 (8th ed. 2012); see also M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY ET AL., 
THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
59–60, 70 (9th ed. 2003). 
 26. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 444. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1972). 
 29. 1971 Sound Recording Act, Pub. L. 92-140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391, 391. 
 30. Id. § 1(e). 
 31. Id. § 1(a). 
 32. Id. § 1(e). 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. 
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sound recordings.35 As noted, the Act specified sound-recording 
reproductions included “parts of instruments serving to 
reproduce mechanically the musical work . . . .”36 Further, the 
Act defined “interchange-able parts, such as discs or tapes, for 
use in mechanical music producing machines adapted to 
reproduce copyrighted musical works” as “copies of the 
copyrighted musical works . . . .”37 
The resulting federal copyright structure creates separate 
musical work and sound recording reproduction rights for the 
typical music-album song. The 1976 Copyright Act copyrights 
work on fixing expression in a tangible medium regardless of 
formal notice and publication.38 So, for instance, a songwriter 
can write a song as sheet music having notes for instruments 
and voices, possibly with lyrics, to form a copyrighted musical 
work.39 A band’s recording of the song would be a copyrighted 
sound recording.40 The musical work and sound recording 
owners may not be the same entity; the songwriter may own 
the musical work, while the band, the producer, or a record 
company may own the sound recording. In fact, for a record 
company to make compact discs (CDs) containing recorded-song 
copies, it would need reproduction rights from both the musical 
work and the sound recording owners.41 
B. RECORDED-MUSIC REPRODUCTION INFRINGEMENT 
1. Reproduction Infringement as Substantial Similarity42 
The Copyright Act’s § 106(1) grants the copyright owner 
the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . .”43 
An independently created work would not infringe the 
copyrighted work, so as a threshold, an alleged infringer must 
                                                          
 35. Id. § 1(d). 
 36. Id. § 1(e) (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. § 2. 
 38. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 48. 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006). 
 40. See id. § 102(a)(7). 
 41. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 445 (comparing musical-work and 
sound-recording copyrights). 
 42. See generally id.  at 325–64 (describing reproduction infringement 
with excerpts from major cases); PETER C. WEILER, ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA 
AND THE LAW 344–65 (3d ed. 2006) (applying substantial similarity to book, 
play, and movie infringement). 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
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have access to the copyrighted work.44 Assuming access, an 
exact copy of the copyrighted work would infringe the 
reproduction right.45 But, a suspect work need only bear a 
“substantial similarity” to the copyrighted work to infringe.46 
The substantial similarity standard and the de minimis use 
defense apply to reproduction rights of multiple types of 
copyrighted works.47 In applying the standard, courts often 
filter out a copyrighted work’s unprotectable elements48 before 
comparing an allegedly infringing work against the copyrighted 
work.49 
Nimmer formulated substantial similarity as derived from 
two basic types: 1) comprehensive nonliteral similarity, and 2) 
fragmented literal similarity.50 
a. Comprehensive Nonliteral Similarity—Copying a Work’s 
Fundamental Essence or Structure 
Comprehensive nonliteral similarity shows “a similarity 
not just as to a particular line or paragraph or other minor 
segment, but where the fundamental essence or structure of 
one work is duplicated in another.”51 But the similarity cannot 
be an abstract idea.52 
Courts have employed many tests to evaluate substantial 
similarity between the suspect works and the copyrighted 
work. Three tests are: 1) the ordinary-lay-observer test; 2) the 
average-lay-observer test; and 3) the total concept and feel. 
                                                          
 44. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Arnstein v. 
Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.)). 
 45. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 359. 
 46. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 
2000); Selle, 741 F.2d at 900. 
 47. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT 369–70 (2d ed. 2009) 
(citing Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801–03 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (applying the substantial similarity standard to costumes) and 
Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying 
the de minimis defense to a commercial’s background illustration)). 
 48. Copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principal, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2006). 
 49. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 
1930) (L. Hand, J.) (noting copyright does not protect ideas as determined by a 
series of abstractions of the copyrighted work). 
 50. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.03 (2010). 
 51. Id. § 13.03[A][1]. 
 52. Id. 
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Generally, the Second Circuit recognizes substantial 
similarity when an “ordinary observer, unless he set out to 
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and 
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”53 
Some courts test whether an “average lay observer” would 
recognize the alleged copy as taken from the copyrighted 
work.54 Where a copyright owner’s work includes public domain 
elements, infringement requires substantial similarity to those 
elements providing copyrightability.55 Where the copyrighted 
work does not include public domain elements, the Second 
Circuit employs the less demanding “average lay observer” 
test.56 
But particularly when comparing pictorial works, courts 
may guide the “average lay observer” test with a “total concept 
and feel” test weighing the work’s whole arrangement.57 
b. Fragmented Literal Similarity—Scattered Literal Copying 
Fragmented literal similarity is based on literal elements 
scattered throughout an infringing work.58 Though the criteria 
for deciding fragmented literal similarity vary, they generally 
weigh the elements’ qualitative and quantitative value to the 
copyrighted work.59 
                                                          
 53. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960) (Hand, J.))) (emphasis added). 
 54. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd, 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 
(2d Cir. 1966) and declining to apply Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner 
Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)) (movie poster). 
 55. Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272 (quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown 
Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 56. Id. (citing Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 57. Id. at 272–73 (discussing prior case law in the Second and Ninth 
Circuits). But see Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 
(9th Cir. 1994)) (applying the total-concept and feel test as part of subjectively 
comparing children’s stories’ expressive elements). 
 58. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2]. This paper’s sound 
quanta may differ from Nimmers’ quanta. 
 59. Id. 
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c. De Minimis Copying and Fair Use Affirmative Defense 
Though a work may contain a copyrighted work’s parts, the 
parts may be so small as to lack import (i.e., be de minimis).60 
In essence, the de minimis use defense asserts lack of 
substantial similarity.61 
In contrast, fair use limits infringement right and 
affirmatively defends against infringement.62 Even so, courts 
sometimes conflate “de minimis” and “fair use.”63 
2. Recorded Music Reproduction Infringement 
As with the general reproduction infringement analysis 
above, absent direct copying evidence, recorded music 
reproduction infringement requires the defendant’s access to 
the plaintiff’s work and substantial similarity between the 
defendant’s and plaintiff’s works.64 Traditionally, assuming 
access, courts employed an “average lay observer” test to test 
the musical-work’s substantial similarity.65 Recently, courts 
have tested musical works with an objective extrinsic test 
coupled with a subjective intrinsic test.66 
                                                          
 60. Id. (citing Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(Motley, J.)); see also id. § 8.01[G]. 
 61. Id. § 8.01[G] & nn.62–62.1 (citing Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP. 
Consulting L.L.C., 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009); Peter Letterese & Assocs., 
Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1306–07 (11th 
Cir. 2008); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004); and 
Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 62. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44, 58, 59–61 
(C.C.D. 1869) (No. 8,136) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344, 348 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.) (stating fair use concepts) and Cary 
v. Kearsley, [1803] 4 Esp. 168; 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (British “fair 
abridgement” doctrine)) (coining the term “fair use”); see generally COHEN ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 24, 526–27 (briefly outlining fair-use history). 
 63. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a]. As conflation 
examples, Nimmer & Nimmer cite, inter alia, Matthews Conveyor Co. v. 
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) and Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a] n.95. 
 64. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 
2000) (citing Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)); Selle v. 
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 65. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 66. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004) rev’g 226 F. Supp. 
2d 1224 (2002) (discussing XSCAPE, One of Those Love Songs, on TRACES OF 
MY LIPSTICK (So So Def 1998) allegedly copied by MARIAH CAREY, Thank God 
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As stated above, starting in 1972, federal copyright has 
protected both musical works and sound recordings.67 Under 
recent precedents, a music sample will infringe a sound-
recording’s reproduction right68 but the sample might not 
infringe the musical work.69 
a. Copying Musical Works—The Ninth Circuit’s Newton v. 
Diamond Decision 
The Ninth Circuit’s Newton v. Diamond decision is the 
main precedent for musical-work reproduction infringement.70 
Newton sued the Beastie Boys for infringing his musical work, 
Choir.71 Newton performed and recorded Choir and licensed the 
sound recording to ECM Records in 1981, but he kept all the 
musical-work rights.72 
In 1992, the Beastie Boys repeated (looped) six-seconds of 
Choir’s sound recording for their recording, Pass the Mic.73 
They had licensed the sound recording from ECM Records but 
not the musical work from Newton.74 
The Beastie Boy’s loop was held to be a non-infringing de 
minimis use of the musical work.75 Because Newton did not 
assert sound-recording rights, the court did not rule on sound-
recording infringement.76 The sound recording corresponds to 
part of the musical work, three notes (C, D-flat, and C), sung 
over a fluted background C.77 The score instructed the whole 
song to be played largo/senza-misura.78 Also, as the court 
                                                          
I Found You, on RAINBOW (Columbia 2000)). 
 67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2006). 
 68. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 
185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). This decision did not specify whether sampling infringed 
the musical work or the sound recording. 
 69. Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 
410 F.3d 792, 800–04 (6th Cir. 2005) (sound recordings), with Newton v. 
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004) (musical works). 
 70. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192–96 (outlining de minimis use and 
reproduction rights). 
 71. Id. at 1190. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1192. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (noting largo/senza-misura means “slowly/without-measure”). 
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reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision for 
the Beastie Boys, it assumed all Newton’s allegations.79 In 
particular, the court assumed the score’s instructions for 
overblowing the flute note while singing the vocal notes.80 
In order to decide if the sound recording contained unique 
musical-work parts, the court filtered out the parts unique to 
the recording.81 Copyright law only allows Newton to protect 
the musical work he fixed in the written score’s tangible 
medium.82 After filtering out the performance parts, the court 
reasoned the musical-work substantial similarity test reduced 
to Nimmer’s fragmented literal similarity test due to the 
limited copying.83 Applying the fragmented literal similarity 
test, the three-note section only appeared once in Choir, so it 
was quantitatively insignificant to Choir.84 Because the section 
was no more significant to Choir overall than any other section, 
it was also qualitatively insignificant to Choir.85 Thus, the 
sample’s quantitative and qualitative insignificance to the 
original work implied a de minimis use in the suspect work.86 
The court held the Beastie Boys’ sampling of Choir in Pass the 
Mic failed the fragmented limited similarity test and was thus 
a de minimis use.87 
b. Copying Sound Recordings 
Sampling sound-recording reproduction infringement is 
much less clear. The Sixth Circuit’s controversial Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I)88 is the main 
opinion.89 But the Eleventh Circuit District Court90 and a New 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1193–94. 
 82. Id. at 1191–92. 
 83. Id. at 1195 (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2010)). 
 84. Id. at 1195–96. 
 85. Id. at 1196. 
 86. Id. at 1192–93. 
 87. Id. at 1195–96. 
 88. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 
792 passim (6th Cir. 2005) (film soundtrack). 
 89. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 449–58 (including Bridgeport 
I regarding sampling of sound recordings); Joshua Crum, Comment, The Day 
the (Digital) Music Died: Bridgeport, Sampling Infringement, and Proposed 
Middle Ground, 2008 BYU L. REV. 943, 957–60; Mongillo, supra note 5, at 17–
22; Tracy L. Reilly, Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An 
Endorsement of the Bridgeport Music Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” 
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York State court,91 applying New York’s own copyright laws, 
expressly rejected Bridgeport I’s analysis. 
i. The Sixth Circuit—Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films (Bridgeport I) 
Bridgeport I involved sampling Get Off Your Ass and Jam 
(Get Off), by George Clinton and the Funkadelics, for 100 Miles 
and Runnin’ (100 Miles). The sampled part lasted four seconds 
and contained three single notes from a guitar solo. The notes 
would have formed a chord if played at the same time.92 
(Unlike piano chords, guitar chords rarely have all notes played 
simultaneously because strumming a guitar necessarily 
involves playing individual strings at different times; the faster 
a player strums, the less time there is between plucking each 
string.93) The sampler lowered the notes’ pitch, looped them for 
sixteen beats, and played them in five places in 100 Miles. 
Dimension Films included 100 Miles in I Got the Hook Up’s 
soundtrack. Musical work infringement was not at issue 
because Dimension Films had a synchronizing license.94 
The court found 100 Miles failed to infringe the Get Off 
sound recording regardless of whether it applied the de 
minimis standard or the fragmented limited similarity test.95 
The court reasoned that de minimis analysis comes from 
substantial similarity analysis because de minimis analysis 
“argues that the literal copying of a small and insignificant 
portion of the copyrighted work should be allowed.”96 Further, 
the district court viewed fragmented literal similarity as a 
                                                          
Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 357–58 
(2008). 
 90. Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
 91. Decision and Order at 3–5, EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp. 
L.P., No. 601209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2008). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See NEVILLE H. FLETCHER & THOMAS D. ROSSING, THE PHYSICS OF 
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS 255, 352–59 (2d ed. 1998). 
 94. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 
792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 
F. Supp. 2d 830, 833–38 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)). 
 95. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841 
(M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
 96. Id. (citing Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(Motley, J.)). 
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substantial-similarity test.97 Thus, the district court applied 
the substantial similarity test to musical-work and sound-
recording sampling. 
But the appeals court held 100 Miles infringed the Get Off 
sound recording. It rejected the district court’s analysis for its 
own statutory interpretation98 and put forth the bright-line 
rule that any sampling infringes the sampled sound 
recording.99 
The appeals court unconvincingly stressed judicial 
economy failed to dictate its rule. It said, “When one considers 
that [the district judge] has hundreds of other cases all 
involving different samples from different songs, the value of a 
principled bright-line rule becomes apparent. We want to 
emphasize, however, that considerations of judicial economy 
are not what drives this opinion.”100 The court failed to 
elaborate on the hundreds of other cases. But the follow-up 
case, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. 
(Bridgeport II), referred to several hundred copyright 
infringement cases filed by Bridgeport Music, Inc. and 
Southfield Music, Inc. against roughly 800 defendants.101 The 
district court split the original complaints into 476 cases.102 
With such a huge backlog, judicial economy seems to have 
driven Bridgeport I’s bright-line rule. 
Even so, according to Bridgeport II, though Bridgeport I 
declined to apply the fragmented literal similarity test to sound 
recordings,103 the Sixth Circuit deemed fragmented literal 
similarity as a valid musical-work infringement test.104 
Bridgeport I acknowledged potential logical problems with 
analyzing sound-recording and musical-work infringement 
differently.105 But it justified the difference due to problems 
applying a de minimis or substantial similarity standard to 
sound recordings, its statutory interpretation of § 114(b), and 
                                                          
 97. Id. 
 98. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 797–805. 
 99. Id. at 799–804. 
 100. Id. at 802. 
 101. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585 
F.3d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The 
Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 275. 
 104. Id. at 275–77. 
 105. See Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801. 
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small sound-recording parts’ innate values.106 At key points, 
Bridgeport I relied on papers by Jeffrey R. Houle, Rebecca 
Morris through Stephen R. Wilson, Susan J. Latham, and 
Christopher D. Abramson.107 But Bridgeport I misleadingly 
quoted these papers against context. 
a. Houle Argued Literal Infringement Should Be Weighed 
in Light of the Copied Sections’ Qualitative Import thus 
Supporting Fragmented Literal Similarity for Sampling 
To reject applying de minimis analysis and substantial 
similarity to sound recordings, Bridgeport I quoted Jeffrey R. 
Houle: 
Thus, it seems like the only way to infringe on a sound recording is to 
re-record sounds from the original work, which is exactly the nature 
of digital sound sampling. Then the only issue becomes whether the 
defendant re-recorded sound from the original. This suggests that the 
substantial similarity test is inapplicable to sound recordings.108 
But contrary to this isolated quote, Houle proposed 
tempering infringement with the copied section’s qualitative 
import. Houle’s paper mainly concerned “whether the practice 
of digitally sampling a copyrighted record violates the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971.”109 The quote sits in the “Judicial 
Tendency and Sound Recording Act” section where Houle 
argues “[j]udicial tendency . . . fails to take into account the 
nature and substance of the notes taken.”110 Houle’s preceding 
paragraph argued copying some qualitatively important 
musical-composition or sound-recording parts could infringe 
without copying the whole song.111 The paper concluded: 
 In reality, the activity of digital sampling only becomes an issue 
when the portion sampled is qualitatively rich and allows the sampler 
to imbue his song with the qualities and identity of the copyright 
protected work. This is tantamount to pirating the entire song from its  
 
 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 801–02. 
 107. Id. at 801 n.10, 802 nn.13–15. 
 108. Id. at 801 n.13 (quoting Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, 
Copyright Law and the American Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad 
“RAP”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 896 (1992)). 
 109. Jeffery R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling Copyright Law and the 
American Music Industry: Piracy of Just a “RAP”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 882 
(1992). 
 110. Id. at 895 (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. 
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author since the samples taken most often contain the “soul” and 
substance of the host song.112 
Houle supported weighing a copied section’s qualitative import 
in deciding sound-recording reproduction infringement by 
sampling. Thus, in essence, Houle supported a fragmented 
literal similarity test for sound-recording infringement.113 
b. Morris Suggested the Lack of a Bright-Line Rule 
Already Motivated Samplers to Settle Before Trial Without 
Bridgeport I 
Bridgeport I also justified the bright-line rule over de 
minimis analysis and/or substantial similarity by quoting 
Stephen R. Wilson, quoting Rebecca Morris: 
The current lack of bright-line rules leads to unpredictability, which 
may be one reason that so few sampling cases are brought to 
trial . . . . A cost-benefit analysis generally indicates that is less 
expensive for a sampler to purchase a license before sampling (or 
settle a post-sampling lawsuit) rather than take his chances in an 
expensive trial, the outcome of which . . . is nearly impossible to 
predict with any degree of certainty.114 
Wilson quoted Morris to support the assertion that most 
sampling cases settled.115 Neither Morris nor Wilson explained 
why cost-benefit analysis works against bringing sampling 
suits to trial. 
Morris seems to have impliedly assumed basic decision-
theory tenets. When an actor must choose between outcomes 
without any information, the outcome probabilities should be 
assumed equal.116 Each outcome’s expected value is its value  
 
 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 902 (emphasis added). 
 113. Cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a] (“[E]ven if the 
similar material is quantitatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the 
trier of fact may properly find substantial similarity.”). 
 114. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 
792, 802 n.15 (6th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Stephen R. 
Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De 
Minimis Defense, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 187 n.97 (2002) (quoting Rebecca 
Morris, When is a CD Factory Not Like a Dance Hall?: The Difficulty of 
Establishing Third-Party Liability for Infringing Digital Music Samples, 18 
CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 274 (2000))). 
 115. Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music 
Samples Defeat the De Mininis Defense, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 187 (2002). 
 116. E.g., DAVID R. HENDERSON & CHARLES L. HOOPER, MAKING GREAT 
DECISIONS IN BUSINESS AND IN LIFE 160–61 (2006). 
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multiplied by its probability.117 The best choice has the highest 
expected value.118 
Applying these concepts in the pre-Bridgeport I regime, the 
sampling trial-defendant faced two outcomes: 1) winning 
without getting any payment; or 2) losing and paying 
infringement damages. Assuming lawyer fees would be the 
same for winning and losing, the unpredictability of winning or 
losing (i.e., each having a probability of one-half) and outcome 
(1)’s zero return and outcome (2)’s potentially large costs made 
going to trial a bad choice compared with settling. Thus, the 
astute sampler would have avoided going to trial and settled. 
This analysis shows the Morris quote gives little support 
for Bridgeport I’s bright-line rule. Though Bridgeport I’s bright-
line rule further pushes samplers to settle, the unpredictability 
caused by the lack of a bright-line rule already strongly pushed 
samplers to settle. 
c. Unlike Brideport I, Latham Recognized a Possible De 
Minimus Use (I.E. Lack of Substantial Similarity), but 
May Have Conflated De Minimus Use and Fair Use 
Bridgeport I interpreted § 114(b) to imply “a sound 
recording owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own 
recordings.”119 The court justified this rule by quoting Susan J. 
Latham: 
[B]y clarifying the rights of a sound recording copyright owner in 
regard to derivative works, Section 114(b) makes it clear that the 
digital sampling of a copyrighted sound recording must typically be 
licensed to avoid an infringement . . . . The import of this language is 
that it does not matter how much a digital sampler alters the actual 
sounds or whether the ordinary lay observer can or cannot recognize 
the song or the artist’s performance of it. Since the exclusive right 
encompasses rearranging, remixing, or otherwise altering the actual 
sounds, the statute by its own terms precludes the use of a 
substantial similarity test.120 
But unlike Bridgeport I, Latham recognized a possible de 
minimis use defense. First, the quote said sampling would 
                                                          
 117. E.g., id. at 141–61. 
 118. E.g., id. 
 119. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801. 
 120. Id. at 801 n.10 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the 
Legitimacy of Unauthorized Compositional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated 
and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 125 (2003)). 
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“typically”(i.e., generally), require licensing; it failed to 
prescribe licensing for all sampling. Second, though right after 
the quote, Latham said “the defenses available to a defendant 
are significantly limited.”121 Footnote thirty-five, cited by this 
last quote, began “[t]here may be the possibility of a de minimis 
use defense, depending on how strictly the court interprets the 
‘actual sounds’ language of the statute.”122 Third, the quote did 
not clearly relate de minimis use with infringement falling 
below substantial similarity, and the rest of footnote thirty-five 
seems to conflate de minimis use with fair use: “However, a fair 
use defense also seems to be limited by § 114(b) to use within 
noncommercially distributed educational television and radio 
programming.”123 
d. Abramson Recognized Possible Substantial Similarity 
for Sound Recordings 
Bridgeport I also justified different infringement standards 
for musical works and sound recordings by assuming an innate 
value for tiny sound recording parts,124 relying on a quote from 
Abramson’s paper: 
[A]ll samples from a record appropriate the work of the musicians 
who performed on that record. This enables the sampler to use a 
musical performance without hiring either the musician who 
originally played it or a different musician to play the music again. 
Thus sampling of records . . . allows a producer of music to save 
money (by not hiring a musician) without sacrificing the sound and 
phrasing of a live musician in the song. This practice poses the 
greatest danger to the musical profession because the musician is 
being replaced with himself.125 
By relying on this quote, Bridgeport I impliedly assumed 
Lockean-labor property theory;126 Bridgeport I conferred a 
property right on any sound recording excerpt based on labor 
expended in creating or obtaining it regardless how small or 
insignificant.127 
                                                          
 121. Susan J. Lantham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of 
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 125 (2003). 
 122. Id. at 125 n.35 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801–02. 
 125. Id. at 802 n.14 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician: A 
Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667–68 (1999)). 
 126. See infra Part III.A.2.b.i. 
 127. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801–02. 
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But Abramson did not exclude other factors from deciding 
sound recording infringement. The clause right before the 
quote conceded “the length and recognizability of the sample 
may be relevant for copyright purposes . . . .”128 In fact, footnote 
thirty-eight referred to the Abramson’s next section containing 
a more nuanced analysis. In light of Grand Upright’s 
vagueness, that section recognized possible de minimis and fair 
use defenses despite technical sound recording infringement by 
any copying.129 Thus, though Abramson’s paper generally 
concerned sampling and labor issues, it recognized possible de 
minimis analysis (i.e., lack of substantial similarity) or the 
fragmented limited similarity test as applied by Newton.130 
ii. Eleventh Circuit District Court Declined to Apply 
Bridgeport I 
Rejecting Bridgeport I’s bright-line rule forbidding all 
sound-recording sampling, the Eleventh Circuit District Court 
applied a substantial similarity test for sound recording 
reproduction infringement.131 In expressly refusing to follow 
Bridgeport I, Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley extensively 
critiqued Brideport I’s statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114(b).132 
First, copyright grants the owner the exclusive right “to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”133 
Saregama found no congressional intent to extend § 114(b)’s 
derivative work provisions to include “all works containing any 
sound from the original sound recording” regardless of 
substantial similarity.134 
 
                                                          
 128. Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording 
Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667 
(1999). The full sentence reads, “Although the length and recognizability of the 
sample may be relevant for copyright purposes, all samples from a record 
appropriate the work of the musicians who performed on that record.” Id. 
 129. Id. at 1669–72. 
 130. A section below discusses labor property theory and its relevance to 
musical-work and sound-recording reproduction infringement. See infra Part 
III.A.2.b.i. 
 131. Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 
2009) (quoting Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 132. Id. at 1340–41. 
 133. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
 134. Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1340. 
2_CARTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  11:57 AM 
2013] FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY TEST 689 
Second, § 114(b) exempts similar-sounding, but 
independently created, recordings from sound recording 
infringement.135 Saregama rejected Bridgeport I’s 
interpretation of § 114(b)’s similar-sounding work provision 
extending it “to every sound fixed in the work such that a 
sample of any sound automatically constitutes infringement.”136 
Instead, Saregama interpreted the provision to mean 
“protection in a copyrighted sound recording ‘do[es] not extend’ 
to sound recordings which, although similar-sounding, do not 
capture any sounds from the copyrighted sound recording.”137 
Third, Saregama found no congressional intent indicating 
§ 114(b)’s similar-sounding work provision should not apply to 
works which are not similar-sounding or substantially 
similar.138 According to the House Report, for a sound 
recording, “infringement takes place whenever all or a 
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a 
sound recording are reproduced in phonorecords . . . .”139 
iii. New York Court Refused to Adopt Bridgeport I Based 
on Nimmer 
In addition to the Eleventh Circuit District Court, a New 
York court refused to adopt the Brideport I standard for the 
state’s copyright laws protecting pre-1972 sound recordings.140 
New York common law protects sound recordings made before 
February 15, 1972, the federal 1971 Sound Recording Act’s 
effective date.141 (As noted, federal copyright law does not 
preempt state law before the effective date.142) In EMI Records 
Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., the plaintiffs expressly advanced 
Bridgeport I as persuasive authority for a New York copyright 
infringement claim against a sampler. 
                                                          
 135. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not 
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists 
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds 
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”). 
 136. Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1340. 
 137. Id. (alteration in original). 
 138. Id. at 1341. 
 139. Id. (quoting H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721). 
 140. Decision and Order, supra note 91, at 5–7. 
 141. Id. at 5 (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 
250, 252 (2005)). 
 142. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1972). 
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In rejecting Bridgeport I’s analysis, the New York court 
relied on Nimmer’s analysis of Bridgeport I and § 114(b).143 
Nimmer reasoned Bridgeport I based its conclusion on flawed 
logic: because § 114 exempts a second comer from liability when 
no sounds are recaptured, as in a whole sound-alike recording, 
then copyright law should impose complete liability when some 
sounds are recaptured regardless of substantial similarity.144 
But if a whole recording is a sound-alike recording, then there 
is no infringement, under the exemption. Taking the 
contrapositive, if there is infringement, then not the whole 
recording (i.e., at least some of the recording) is not a sound-
alike recording. 
Nimmer also argued § 114(b)’s lawmaking history showed 
Congress did not want to chuck the substantial-similarity 
infringement test for sound recordings.145 If substantial 
similarity implies infringement, the contrapositive says no 
infringement implies there is no substantial similarity, subject 
to the sound-alike exemption. 
III. APPLYING THE FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY 
TEST TO MUSICAL WORKS AND SOUND RECORDINGS 
Music is distinct from what represents it. Music is sounds 
or tones arranged to “form structurally complete and 
emotionally expressive compositions . . . .”146 Restated, humans 
construct music from natural phenomena, sounds and tones, to 
form what humans recognize as complete compositions 
expressing emotions. But music representations are generally 
not sounds or tones. For instance, notes on paper and sound 
recordings represent music but are not sounds or tones.147 
Through the Copyright Act, Congress chose to protect 
specific music representations from infringement. Copyright 
law protects music representations “fixed in any tangible 
                                                          
 143. Decision and Order, supra note 91, at 5–7 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[2][b] (2010) 
(extensively critiquing Bridgeport I)). 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. Id. 
 146. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 894 (Victoria Neufeldt 
& David B. Guralnik eds., 3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S]. 
 147. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 448, 451 n.12 (2007) 
(analogizing software in the abstract with notes of a symphony and software 
in the tangible medium of a CD with sheet music in a patent-dispute context). 
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medium of expression.”148 The protected representations are 
“musical works, including any accompanying words,” and 
“sound recordings.”149 Sound recordings exclude “the sounds 
accompanying a motion picture or audiovisual work . . . .”150 
Typically, sheet music embodies a musical work, and a 
phonorecord, such as a master recording, embodies a sound 
recording.151 Compact discs (CDs), audio tape cassettes, and 
long-playing records (LPs) reproduced from the master 
recording are also phonorecords.152 
Musical-work and sound-recording music representations 
share similarities. First, neither a “musical work” nor a “sound 
recording” is music. Second, each also requires something or 
someone to produce music. A musical work requires a human, 
mechanical, or electrical musician to produce musical sounds. 
Sound recordings require a machine, such as a phonograph or 
CD player, to produce music. 
A framework for applying the fragmented literal-similarity 
test for reproduction infringement of both musical works and 
sound recordings appears below. The fragmented literal-
similarity test compares the copyrighted and allegedly 
infringing works both quantitatively and qualitatively.153 Both 
musical works and sound recordings can be fragmented into 
sound quanta; a musical work can be discretized into notes 
while a particular sound recording can be discretized into short 
recorded-sound snippets. 
The quanta of the copyrighted and allegedly infringing 
works can be directly compared to test reproduction 
infringement. Quantitatively, the allegedly infringing work 
would infringe either the musical-work or sound-recording 
copyright, or both, when a specified percentage of quanta 
match. The qualitative value of the matching quanta to the 
copyrighted work would influence the percentage. Lockean 
labor can contribute to a sound sample’s qualitative value. 
                                                          
 148. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 149. Id. § 102(a)(2), (7). 
 150. Id. § 101. 
 151. Id. §§ 101, 102(a), 114(b). The copyrightable works categories 
protecting music overlap. Literary works include works expressed in symbols 
and include phonorecords. Id. § 101. Dramatic works include accompanying 
music (e.g., musical theatre or opera). Id. § 102(a)(3); see also MCJOHN, supra 
note 47, at 33–34. 
 152. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a), 114(b) (2006). 
 153. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a]. 
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Even so, human perceptibility of a sound recording sample 
should be a quantitative and qualitative threshold. 
This framework applies to musical-work and sound-
recording reproduction infringement. When applied to a 
musical work, this framework resembles reproduction 
infringement analyses the Ninth Circuit rejected in Swirsky v. 
Carey.154 The framework can also test sound-recording 
infringement in Bridgeport I. The framework also gives a 
simple method for testing whether the album Feed the Animals 
infringes the musical works and sound recordings sampled by 
Girl Talk. 
A. FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING FRAGMENTED LITERAL 
SIMILARITY TO MUSICAL WORKS AND SOUND RECORDINGS 
As noted above, the fragmented literal similarity test 
probes for a copyrighted work’s literal elements scattered 
through an allegedly infringing work.155 The very formulation 
of substantial similarity as a “fragmented” similarity implies 
comparing a copyrighted work’s discrete elements with an 
allegedly infringing work’s discrete elements. This paper’s 
sound quanta may differ from Nimmers’ quanta. 
1. Musical Works156 
As already noted, the Ninth Circuit applied its own version 
of the fragmented literal similarity test to a specific musical 
work. This section shows the general applicability of the 
fragmented literal similarity test to musical works 
reproduction infringement generally, not only to specific 
alleged infringing music samples. 
Musical notes are like letters in a word language. Letters 
and words digitize the analog reality into discrete 
representations.157 As written text represents speech as letters 
and words, sheet music represents music as notes written left 
                                                          
 154. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 passim (9th Cir. 2004), rev’g 226 F. 
Supp. 2d 1224 (2002). 
 155. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2]. 
 156. See generally PHIL WINSOR & GENE DELISA, COMPUTER MUSIC IN C, at 
1–32 (1991) (describing digitizing music as parameters for the musical 
instrument digital interface (MIDI) format); 3 BILL GIBSON, THE AUDIOPRO 
HOME RECORDING COURSE 9–59 (1999) (describing Musical Instrument 
Digital Interface theory and sequencing). 
 157. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT 4 (2010). 
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to right on “staves.”158 Time runs from left to right.159 At the 
staff’s or line’s right end, the notes continue on the next staff or 
line at the left and continue to the right.160 More lines with 
more notes represent more music.161 In this way, sheet music 
innately represents music discretely, or digitally, as notes in 
time. 
Carrying the analogy with written word language further, 
each set of multiple notes played simultaneously, as in an 
interval or chord, could correspond to a different “letter” in a 
music representation “language.” Successive “letters” could be 
grouped into “words.” 
Given this sheet music structure, the fragmented literal 
similarity test can readily decide musical-work reproduction 
infringement. Expressing music as a musical work on sheet 
music innately discretizes music. A quantitative comparison 
should simply weigh how many notes in an alleged infringing 
recording’s section match notes in a copyrighted musical work 
section. 
And, this approach works better for music than for words. 
Words have many ordering rules. For instance, “clerk” is a 
valid word, but “krelc” is gibberish. Even so, a book merely 
chucking all of another book’s vowels would likely infringe; vn 
s, bk mrly chckng ll f nthr bk’s vwls wld lkly nfrng. Though at 
first it might jar the senses, the meaning would be fairly clear. 
The missing vowels would merely be a gimmick to evade exact 
copying though the books would be substantially similar. 
Music notes have fewer ordering problems. Notes played in 
reverse order will not have the same effect, but most people will 
recognize them as music, not gibberish. For instance, a piano, 
guitar, or trombone playing G then E then C rather than C 
then E then G would still play “music” while “krelc” is 
gibberish. 
Under fragmented similarity, the allegedly infringing 
work’s notes could be separated by notes absent from the 
copyrighted section yet still yield the required substantial 
similarity. For instance, a song’s melody often defines a 
copyrighted musical work’s most recognizable part162 and thus 
                                                          
 158. E.g., WALTER PISTON, HARMONY (3d ed. 1962). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 845 (including the musical definitions 
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contains qualitatively significant notes. Suppose the suspect 
work contains a quantitatively significant percentage of melody 
notes from the copyrighted musical work. The suspect work 
could then have embellishing notes between the same 
copyrighted notes yet still infringe as substantially similar 
judged by fragmented literal similarity. 
Relying on the music representation “language” outlined 
above, a fact-finder could more finely test similarity by 
comparing intervals or chords in the copyrighted and suspect 
sections. The language would uniquely represent an interval or 
a chord like a letter or word in English. For instance, a simple 
triad C chord is formed from the notes C, E, and G in a single 
octave. A matching “letter” or “word” in the suspect section 
would include some or all of the notes in a corresponding 
interval or chord in the copyrighted section. Thus, a fact-finder 
might define a match for the C triad as the same C-E-G triad, 
as the intervals C-G, C-E, or E-G, or as the single notes C, E, or 
G. (Due to the harmonious nature of octaves, the triads, 
intervals, or notes can have very similar musical effects even if 
the notes lie in different octaves.163 Mathematically, deeming 
notes separated by an octave to be the same imposes a periodic 
structure. In essence, the twelve-note chromatic scale with 
octaves identified (e.g., identifying all C’s as the same note 
regardless of octave separation) and equating transposed notes, 
chords, and keys, defines a system which is invariant under 
circular rotations generated by the complex number ei/6.164 ) 
The quantitative analysis would be the same as for a lone 
melody. 
2. Sound Recordings 
Unlike musical works, sound recordings may be analog or 
digital.165 The traditional analog LP or tape recording embodies 
                                                          
2b: “the element of form having to do with the arrangement of single notes in 
sequence (distinguished from HARMONY);” and 2c: “the leading part, or voice, 
in a harmonic composition”); see also PISTON, supra note 158, at 3, 71, 125 
(noting the top voice in harmonized music is heard as the melody in 
homophonic music and multiple melodic lines may be heard in polyphonic 
music). 
 163. See, e.g., PISTON, supra note 158, at 6 (reducing compound intervals 
by subtracting the octave). 
 164. See, e.g., RUEL V. CHURCHILL ET AL., COMPLEX VARIABLES AND 
APPLICATIONS 11–19 (4th ed. 1984). 
 165. E.g., DAVID MILES HUBER & ROBERT E. RUNSTEIN, MODERN 
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a continuous transcription of musical sounds into wax, metal, 
or vinyl LP grooves166 or magnetic (metal) tape film.167 In 
transcribing the sound, the recorder moves along the recording 
medium to physically represent the sound in the medium; the 
groove or magnetized tape lengthens as the sound recording 
time increases.168 A sound recording medium property varies 
continuously along the medium with the continuous change in 
music in time.169 For instance, the LP groove’s contour and the 
magnetic film’s magnetized pattern vary along their lengths 
commensurate with recording time.170 In this way, analog 
recording continuously, and possibly exactly, transcribes sound. 
Unlike analog recording, digital recording must inexactly 
transcribe sound.171 Digital recording represents music by 
breaking waveforms into small segments.172 By taking shorter 
time intervals, the digital recording better represents the 
music.173 But at some shortest time interval, the representation 
can become better than can be humanly perceived.174 
The fragmented literal similarity test can readily test for 
sound recording infringement. Any analog recording can be 
represented digitally or converted to a digital recording,175 so 
                                                          
RECORDING TECHNIQUES 187–298 (6th ed. 2005); GIBSON, supra note 156, at 
61–95. 
 166. E.g., IAN SINCLAIR, ELECTRONICS SIMPLIFIED 119–24 (3d ed. 2011), 
Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machs., U.S. Patent No. 200,521 
(filed Dec. 24, 1877) (issued Feb. 19, 1878). 
 167. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 124–28; see also HUBER & RUNSTEIN, 
supra note 165, at 189–90; GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64. 
 168. SINCLAIR, supra note 166 at 119–28; see also ‘521 Patent; HUBER & 
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90;  GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64. 
 169. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–28; see also ‘521 Patent; HUBER & 
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90; GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64. 
 170. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–28; see also ‘521 Patent; HUBER & 
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90;  GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64. 
 171. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–28; see also GIBSON, supra note 156, 
at 62–64, 67–90; HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 216–24. 
 172. HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 217–19; see also GIBSON, 
supra note 156, at 62–64, 67–74; SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 123–36. 
 173. HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 217–19; see also GIBSON, 
supra note 156, at 62–64, 67–74; SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 123–36. 
 174. See HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 36, 221 (showing the 
upper frequency limit of human hearing, 20 kilohertz (kHz), can be effectively 
represented by time segments occurring at a 44.1 kHz rate); see generally 
GIBSON, supra note 156, at 78–79 (listing various common sampling rates and 
indicating 44.1 kHz as the common CD sampling rate). 
 175. See HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 215–26; GIBSON, supra 
note 156, at 62–64. 
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making a framework for applying the fragmented literal 
similarity test only requires considering digital sound-
recordings. Rather than describing sound recordings with a 
general musical language such as notes for musical works, it 
will generally be more convenient to choose a language specific 
to a particular sound recording. A section of a copyrighted 
digital sound recording will have a finite, though possibly large, 
number of digital pieces or snippets. Those pieces will be 
ordered in time to produce music when played in a player, such 
as a CD player or computer. Each snippet would belong to the 
sound recording’s own musical language. 
The musical-works-test framework readily extends to 
testing sound-recording infringement. The fact finder replaces 
notes, intervals, or chords with snippets in the musical-works 
comparison framework. Following the musical-works analysis, 
the fragmented literal similarity test can show substantial 
similarity when the allegedly infringing sound recording 
contains snippets from the copyrighted sound recording. But 
the reproduced snippets may be separated by other snippets 
not in the copyrighted sound recording section. 
a. Quantitative Value 
The snippets in the suspect work could be separated by 
recorded segments not from the copyrighted section work yet 
still yield the requisite quantitative similarity. For instance, 
the allegedly infringing work could have the same snippets as a 
section of a copyrighted sound recording with added 
embellishing snippets between the snippets from the 
copyrighted section yet still infringe. In the example, as all 
snippets in the copyrighted section appear in the allegedly 
infringing section, the qualitatively important snippets of the 
copyrighted section will be included. But their qualitative 
import in the alleged infringing section would depend on other 
factors such as their prominence in the suspect passage. As 
with the musical works analysis, the allegedly infringing work 
would infringe the sound recording when a specified percentage 
of snippets match those of the copyrighted section. 
b. Qualitative Value 
Fragmented literal similarity weighs the snippet’s 
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qualitative value to the copyrighted work.176 Lockean labor can 
contribute to a sound snippet’s qualitative value, but it does not 
imply all sound snippets have a qualitative value to the 
copyrighted work. Lockean-labor value can include the snippet 
length or duration and volume. But human perceptibility 
should be a threshold for qualitative value. 
i. Labor Property Theory and Sound Samples 
Lockean-labor property theory permits a person to 
establish a property right by investing labor in an object or 
thing.177 Bridgeport I assumed the Lockean-labor property 
theory when it argued even tiny sound recording snippets had 
value.178 Bridgeport I argued “even when a small part of a 
sound recording is sampled, the part taken is something of 
value” and quoted Abramson’s paper for support.179 My 
approach posits not all samples have value. 
a. Sound Length—Duration 
Not all samples have equal value. Assuming a sound 
sample has some value directly proportional to its length (in 
time), merely truncating it would diminish its value. With 
repeated truncations, its length would become quite small. 
Eventually, the length would fall below detectability, either for 
a particular technology or in an absolute sense. At that point, 
this ultimately truncated sample would have its smallest 
quantum of value. 
Of course, the original copyrighted music section’s different 
subsections could have different values. If the original music 
section’s whole duration or length had one tone at a constant 
                                                          
 176. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2]. 
 177. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 11–12 (citing JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT, BOOK II, at ch. V (1690)). But see WILLIAM 
A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (citing Wendy J. Gordon, A Property 
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) and Alfred C. Yen, Restoring 
the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 15 OHIO STATE L.J. 517 
(1990)) (acknowledging Lockean labor as a copyright justification but arguing 
copyright is cumulative and not “merely the fruit of one’s own labors.”). 
 178. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 
792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 179. Id. at 802 & n.14 (quoting Christopher D. Abramson, Digital 
Sampling and the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667 (1999)). 
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volume, all subsections would have the same value. But if the 
tone waivered in pitch or volume, different subsections might 
have different intrinsic values resulting in eventually achieving 
different quanta. 
Assuming value directly relates to length impliedly relies 
on Lockean labor theory. A longer sample represents music 
played for a longer time. For the single tone held at a constant 
volume, a longer tone represents more labor by a musician, a 
recording engineering, and a record producer. Recording a 
longer tone would also require more physical resources in a 
longer tape length, more memory in a computer or recording 
workstation, or more physical space on a CD or LP.180 
b. Volume 
Similar arguments may be made for volume proportional to 
labor expended. Higher volume coming from acoustic 
instruments generally requires more physical work. For 
instance, blowing a horn harder, hitting a drum harder, and 
strumming a guitar more vigorously will all produce louder 
sounds than using less effort. Likewise, electrical energy from 
electric instruments transformed into acoustic sound via 
transducers is louder with higher wattage amplifiers.181 
ii. Reproduced Sound’s Human Perceptibility 
Despite Lockean labor theory’s traditional appeal, a sound 
sample’s qualitative value should also depend on human 
perceptibility. Because the recorded tone represents music, one 
should distinguish between the technically feasible and the 
humanly perceivable. The qualitative value of imperceptible 
sound snippets’ qualitative values should be insignificant or 
zero in applying fragmented literal similarity. 
Analog recording at a higher tape speed or with more 
revolutions of a cylinder or playing record per second182 directly 
corresponds to a tone of the same time duration or length 
requiring longer tape lengths or recording-groove travel.183 But 
                                                          
 180. See Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machs., U.S. Patent No. 
200,521 (filed Dec. 24, 1877) (issued Feb. 19, 1878); see GIBSON, supra note 
156, at 61–64; HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90. 
 181. See, e.g., HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 29–31, 33–37, 51–56. 
 182. For example, thirty-three revolutions per minute (RPM) for LP 
records and forty-five RPM for records having a single song per side. 
 183. See ‘521 Patent; see also GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64; HUBER & 
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the recorded tone’s quality generally improves because more 
physical media records the same sound; the resolution is 
higher. Particularly at very high tape speeds or revolution 
rates, it may be technically possible to capture individual sound 
quanta that are too short to be humanly perceived on playback. 
Thus, as a representation of sounds and music, a very high-
quality analog recording can have a non-zero length in the 
recording medium which makes a sound too short to be heard 
on playback at normal speed. 
Unlike analog recording, digital recording has some innate 
limitations. But like analog recording, digitizing sound breaks 
an analog signal into sound representation snippets that may 
also be too short to be perceived on playback; a digitization rate 
(i.e., frequency) of roughly 44.1 kilohertz, and the 
corresponding medium length, represents the upper limit of 
human hearing.184 
B. APPLYING FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY AND DE MINIMIS 
STANDARDS TO SAMPLED SOUND RECORDINGS 
1. Musical Work Infringement—Swirsky v. Carey 
In Swirsky v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit employed a two-part 
substantial similarity test for music-work infringement.185 
Generally, the test included an objective extrinsic test of 
expression and ideas and a subjective intrinsic test.186 The 
intrinsic test would have asked whether an “ordinary, 
reasonable observer” would find substantial similarity of 
expression.187 But in reviewing summary judgment, Swirsky 
only considered the extrinsic test because juries apply the 
intrinsic test.188 
 
                                                          
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90. 
 184. See HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165 at 36, 221 (showing the upper 
frequency limit of human hearing, 20 kHz, can be effectively represented by 
time segments occurring at a 44.1 kHz rate); see generally GIBSON, supra note 
156, at 78–79 (listing various common sampling rates and indicating 44.1 kHz 
as the common CD sampling rate). 
 185. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’g 226 F. 
Supp. 2d 1224 (2002). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 188. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845 (citing Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 
1174 (9th Cir. 2003) and Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected Walser’s and the district court’s 
approaches comparing notes because they could let persons 
untrained in music judge substantial similarity devoid of 
considering harmonic progression, tempo, and key.189 Even so, 
the court expressly refused to announce any uniform factors for 
the extrinsic objective test.190 In dicta, the court said the 
extrinsic test is simpler to apply to literary works such as 
books, films, and television shows than music because they are 
more easily broken into discrete elements such as “plot, 
themes, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of 
events.”191 
This paper expresses the opposite view. Plot, themes, etc. 
are not manifestly discrete elements. But the music’s 
mathematical representations as notes in musical compositions 
and digitized sound recordings necessarily have discrete 
elements. 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the present framework 
comports with both the Walser and district court approaches. 
Walser noted similarities between the plaintiff’s work One of 
Those Love Songs (One) and the defendant’s Thank God I 
Found You (Thank God) by selectively comparing notes.192 
Walser discounted ornamental notes.193 Generally, an 
ornamental tone embellishes a main melodic tone.194 Here, the 
quantitative comparison also compares individual notes and 
possibly drops notes when employing fragmented literal 
similarity. By considering some tones ornamental, Walser 
impliedly assigned a qualitatively higher value to some main 
melodic tones. He assigned a qualitatively higher value to notes 
falling on a beat.195 
The district court also compared the musical work’s 
individual notes.196 It represented tones as numerical 
                                                          
 189. Id. at 845–48. 
 190. Id. at 845–49. 
 191. Id. at 849 n.15 (quoting Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 
1045 (9th Cir. 1994))). 
 192. Id. at 846–47. 
 193. Id. 
 194. WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 955 (“ornament,” definition 5); see 
PISTON, supra note 158, at 89, 253. 
 195. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 847. 
 196. Id. at 847–48. 
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sequences.197 Musicians routinely represent standard 
chromatic scale notes as numbers.198 The present framework 
deems this representation a digitization. Nothing in the 
present framework precludes considering all the copyrighted 
work’s melodic notes, but a fragmented literal similarity test, as 
opposed to comprehensive nonliteral similarity, does not 
require it.199 Comparing a note sequence from the suspect 
work, Thank God, with a sequence in the copyrighted work, 
One, would test whether a quantitatively significant percentage 
of One had been copied. Other factors, such as perceptibility, 
volume, length, and falling on the beat, would determine the 
notes qualitative import to One. 
2. Sound Recording Infringement—Bridgeport I 
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule, the present 
approach does not automatically find infringement for copies of 
even tiny parts of copyrighted sound recordings. The sampled 
part from the copyrighted sound recording Get Off contained 
three notes from the guitar solo.200 The notes pass human 
perceptibility because they were perceivable as notes.201 If two 
large time intervals separated the three notes, they would 
likely be quantitatively insignificant to the section containing 
all three notes. Thus, there would be no fragmented literal 
similarity and no infringement of the sound recording. 
But if the three notes were roughly consecutive in one 
section of the solo, they might be qualitatively and 
quantitatively significant to the sound recording section by 
analogy with the melody analysis above. Given the prominence 
of a guitar solo in a song,202 the three notes would likely be 
qualitatively significant even if the section had other notes, 
such as rhythm and bass guitar notes and chords, played 
simultaneously with the three notes. 
But the appellate and district court descriptions conflict 
                                                          
 197. Id. 
 198. See, e.g., BRUCE BENWARD, SIGHTSINGING COMPLETE 1 (2d ed. 1973); 
SOL BERKOWITZ ET AL., A NEW APPROACH TO SIGHT SINGING 2 (2d ed. 1976); 
WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 250; WINSOR & DELISA, supra note 156, at 27. 
 199. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03. 
 200. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 
792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See PISTON, supra note 158, at 3, 71, 125 (noting prominence of a 
melody such as a guitar solo). 
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somewhat. The appellate decision describes the sampled 
section as a guitar-solo part looped to form sixteen beats and 
played in five places in 100 Miles.203 The district court 
describes the three notes as “a two-second portion of a chord 
section.”204 Unlike pianists, guitarists very rarely 
simultaneously play notes in chords because strumming a 
chord requires playing individual strings, though quickly.205 A 
single two-second chord could hardly be deemed quantitatively 
significant in to the whole Get Off recording. Also, the notes of a 
single chord notes may not be humanly perceptible as single 
notes and thus not qualitatively significant to the Get Off sound 
recording. 
Even so, though the district court in essence applied 
Newton’s approach for testing infringement of sampled musical 
works to sampled sound recordings,206 the present framework 
differs from the district court’s. 
The district court did not clearly delineate de minimis 
analysis from fragmented literal similarity and fair use.207 It 
recognized de minimis use as literally copying a small and 
insignificant part of copyrighted work falling below the 
substantial similarity standard.208 It also noted other courts 
had considered qualitative and quantitative measures of 
appropriated elements in sampling cases.209 But it also posited 
applying Nimmer’s fragmented literal similarity.210 
The court then analyzed the sample’s quantitative and 
qualitative features in the copyrighted sound recording, Get 
Off, and the suspect work, 100 Miles. The court noted the 
sampled section was quantitatively small, two seconds, 
compared with Get Off’s total two-and-one-half minute 
                                                          
 203. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 796. 
 204. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841 
(M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 205. See FLETCHER & ROSSING, supra note 93, at 255, 352–59. 
 206. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (citing Newton v. 
Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Jarvis v. A&M 
Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993)), aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 207. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839–42. 
 208. Id. at 841 (citing Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 
1983) (Motley, J.)). 
 209. Id. (citing Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (citing Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993))). 
 210. Id. 
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length.211 But the Court noted the alleged infringer looped the 
sample to at most forty seconds of 100 Miles total four-and-one-
half minute length and thus formed a more significant part of 
the suspect work than Get Off.212 More importantly, the court 
found the sampled two-section section qualitatively 
insignificant in 100 Miles based the songs’ overall lack of 
similarity and theme, and a lay observer’s inability to discern 
the sample in 100 Miles.213 The court then conflated the 
analysis with fair use by discussing striking a balance between 
protecting artists and depriving the building blocks of 
creation.214 
In contrast, the present framework more faithfully applies 
the Nimmer fragmented literal similarity test. Nimmer’s 
fragmented literal similarity only demands the part be 
quantitatively and qualitatively significant to the plaintiff’s 
work; the test ignores the quantitative and qualitative import 
of the copyrighted part in the defendant’s work.215 Thus, the 
present framework does not weigh the songs overall similarity 
and theme or whether a lay observer would discern the 
sampled part in the suspect work. The lay observer only enters 
the framework through minimal human perceptibility of the 
copied part in general, not in the suspect work. By ignoring 
overall similarity and theme, the present framework more 
clearly focuses on the sounds reproduced by making a more 
mathematical analysis. Thus, a song, such as 100 Miles, that 
copied the quantitatively and qualitative insignificant two-
second portion would not infringe the Get Off sound recording 
regardless the times the suspect song (e.g., 100 Miles) looped 
the two-second section. But by chucking overall similarity and 
theme, taking a quantitatively and qualitatively significant 
part of Get Off would infringe the Get Off sound recording 
regardless of genre; the analysis would focus on the sound itself. 
3. Musical Works and Sound Recordings—Girl Talk 
Girl Talk’s Feed the Animals216 album used about 300 
samples from about 100 MP3’s.217 The musical-works 
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infringement analysis simply applies the digitization through 
notes analysis. 
Analyzing Girl Talk’s collages for sound-recording 
infringement becomes harder without Bridgeport I’s bright-line 
rule, but the fragmented literal similarity framework can be 
applied to them. Because MP3’s are digital sound recording 
representations of music, Feed the Animals contains a finite 
number of snippets. It should be fairly easy for the sound-
recordings’ copyright-owners to generate the sound recording 
language for each of their sound recordings amongst the 100. 
With the language in hand, each copyright owner could readily 
compare the sound recording against Feed the Animals to see 
whether the album had quantitatively significant parts of the 
copied sound recording. The qualitative value would depend on 
details of the particular sampled copyrighted part. 
If some sound recording owners cannot detect parts of their 
own works actually in Feed the Animals, this fact may suggest 
quantitative or qualitative insignificance, such as 
imperceptibility, in the original copyrighted work and the 
absence of substantial similarity. In practice, an undetected 
infringement will remain moot. 
Rather than fair use, the main defense would be de 
minimis use falling below substantial similarity under the 
fragmented literal similarity test. 
IV. FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY WORKS TO TEST 
INFRINGEMENT OF MUSIC REPRESENTED AS A 
MUSICAL WORK OR A SOUND RECORDING 
Newton v. Diamond and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films have left an unsatisfying legacy of drastically 
disparate reproduction rights for musical works and sound 
recordings. The substantial similarity standard should be 
applied to decide whether music, represented as either a 
musical work or a sound recording, is infringed. When the 
substantial similarity standard is applied to a music recording 
containing sampled copyrighted recordings, the fragmented 
literal similarity test works for both musical-work and sound-
recording infringement. 
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